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NOTES
CHOICE OF LAW AND THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY:
DOMICILE AS AN ESSENTIAL FIRST STEP

INTRODUCTION

Choice of law analyses in right of publicity cases can
lead to disturbingly disparate results. Sharp differences in
state laws render the application of one state's law over
another the deciding factor in many right of publicity actions.'
Twenty-seven states recognize the right of publicity under
either common law or statute.2 Even among states recognizing
the right, there are distinct differences in its definition. Some
states define the right as sounding in tort,' others consider it a
property right.4 Perhaps the most dramatic difference concerns
the question of descendibility. While some states regard
descendibility as inherent in the right of publicity,' others
reject that idea and consider the right terminated at death. 6
1

Richard Cameron Cray, Comment, Choice of Law in Right of Publicity, 31

UCLA L. REV. 640, 644 (1984); Stanley Rothenberg et al., Choice of Law in SoundAlike Cases, 14 ENT. L. REP 3, 7 (1993).
2 Of course, this means that twenty-three states have not recognized the
right expressly. J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY § 6:3

(2000).

3 McFarland v. Miller, 14 F.3d 912, 917 (3d Cir. 1994) (stating "In New
Jersey, McFarland's claim to a right of publicity sounds in tort.").
4 CAL. CwV. CODE § 3344.1 (Deering 2000); IND. CODE ANN. § 32-13(1-20)
(Michie 1999).
r States that have expressly recognized descendibility in their respective
statutes include California, Florida, Indiana, Kentucky, Nebraska, Nevada, Oklahoma,
Tennessee, Texas, Virginia and Washington. However, these states sharply differ in
the term of years after death in which the right would be recognized. (Tennessee: ten
years or more if use continues, Indiana: one hundred years Kentucky- fifty years, etc.)
MCCARTHY, supra note 2, at § 6:8.
6 States that do not expressly recognize descendibility include New York,
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Most definitions of the right distinguishing it from its
tort ancestry as a property right define it as both assignable
and descendible.' However, there is no common scheme or rule
that settles the right as sounding in either tort or property. As
the Supreme Court has set forth in Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard
Broadcasting Co.,8 the states are free to make such
determinations within their own statutory schemes or judicial
arenas. Some states define the right as a pure property right
and deem that it is descendible and assignable,9 while others
resist this advance and maintain that the right should stay
comfortably rooted with its tort companions. 0 Not surprisingly,
these varying definitions yield striking results in practice.
Whereas one state finds that the right of publicity passes to the
heirs of the deceased, another may find that a right not
exploited in one's lifetime never came into existence. The
unpredictability for litigants is distressing, to say the least.
Plaintiffs run the risk of later learning that they have set up
their licensing schemes in the wrong state upon the untimely
death of their cash-cow licensor. Defendants run the risk of
printing a poster or advertisement that must be kept out of
states with extremely broad protective statutes, or of being
forced to comply with a state's most restrictive guidelines.
While commentators scream for a unifying federal
statute1 ' to end the melee of "considerable disarray""' of
"confused and conflicting"" laws that are "inherently
Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Utah and Wisconsin. McCARTHY, supra note 2, at § 6:8;
see also Heinz v. The Frank Lloyd Wright Found., No. 91 CV 0931, No. 91 CV 0942,
1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10688, *38-*44 (N.D. Ill. July 16, 1992) (determining that no
survivable right of publicity exists in Illinois, Wisconsin, or Arizona).
See supranote 4.
8 433 U.S. 562, 573-75 (1977).
9 See supranote 4.
'0 N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW §§ 50-51 (McKinney 1999).
" See, e.g., Cray, supra note 1, at 641; Eric J. Goodman, A National Identity
Crisis: The Need for a Federal Right of Publicity Statute, 9 J. ART & ENT. LAw 227
(1999); Marci A. Hamilton et al., Symposium: Rights ofPublicity:An In-Depth Analysis
of the New Legislative Proposalsto Congress, 16 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 209 (1998);
Richard S. Robinson, Symposium: Preemption, The Right of Publicity, and a New
Federal Statute, 16 CARDOzO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 183, 183 (1998); J. Eugene Salomon,
Jr., The Right of PublicityRun Riot: The Case for a FederalStatute, 60 S. CAL. L. REV.
1179, 1179 (1987).
12 WILLIAM M. RICHMAN & WILLIAM L.
REYNOLDS, UNDERSTANDING
CONFLICT OF LAWS § 70[a] (1984).
13 Cray, supra note 1, at 651.
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arbitrary" -none seems forthcoming. Some stop-gap measure
is essential to simplify matters in the meantime. That essential
stop-gap measure is the comforting choice of law touchstone of
domicile. New York and California are two fora that have had
the most experience in addressing the complicated issue of
defining the right of publicity when a choice of law problem
presents itself in descendibility questions. Both states have
ultimately concluded that a bifurcated approach is necessary."
That is, the domicile of the decedent is looked to initially to
determine whether the right of publicity exists. Then, another
state's law can be applied to determine the scope of that right.
This approach is not revolutionary; rather, it is in compliance
with traditional choice of law rules regarding the descendibility
of property. 6
This Note examines the use of domicile as a
touchstone in determining the existence of the right of
publicity. From an examination of the rule used in practice to
determine the descendibility of the right, this Note ultimately
will show the wisdom of extrapolating the rule from that arena
to the more garden variety right of publicity case where the
claimant is still alive. Part L.A provides a brief background into
the history and development of the right of publicity. Part I.B
examines the factors affecting choice of law analyses that differ
by state in an attempt to assess the difficulty of establishing
any kind of stability. Part I.C addresses the effect of differing
choice of law theories on the right of publicity, the familiar
uneasiness of interpreting state right of publicity law in the
federal courts, and the problems arising from diverse
characterization of the right of publicity. Parts II.A and II.B
examine how courts in California and New York, respectively,
ultimately reached the conclusion that an initial domicile
control to determine the right's existence is necessary. Part III
will demonstrate the dangers inherent in defining the right of
publicity without an initial domicile control. To prove this, Part
III examines one of the largely untested right of publicity
14

Id. at 641.

See Lord Simon Cairns v. Franklin Mint Co., 24 F. Supp. 2d 1013, 1023-26
(C.D. Cal. 1998), affd sub noma, Diana Princess of Wales Mem'l Fund v. The Franklin
Mint Co., Inc., 216 F.3d 1082 (9th Cir. 1999); Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 100205 (2d Cir. 1989); Southeast Bank, N.A. v. Lawrence, 66 N.Y.2d 910, 489 N.E.2d 744,
498 N.Y.S.2d 775 (1985).
"; See discussion of property choice of law rules infra Part I.B.
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statutes, the extremely broad Indiana statute. 7 The Indiana
statute is approached from the point of view of a hypothetical
plaintiff and defendant embarking on a litigation. Part IV
analyzes the operation of the domicile rule as it affects living
plaintiffs, and illustrates that the domicile control is the most
logical, fair, and effective stop-gap measure in determining the
right of publicity's existence in the absence of any unifying
federal regulation.
I.

BACKGROUND OF RIGHT OF PUBLICITY AND CHOICE OF
LAW PRINCIPLES

A.

Background of the Right of Publicity

The right of publicity is, in hillbilly parlance, the redheaded step-child of misappropriation and the right to privacy.
When Dean Prosser articulated the four varieties of the right
to privacy in his seminal article,"8 the right of publicity lurked
somewhere in the gray area between "false light" and
misappropriation. 9 Perhaps reasonably, there was no place in
Dean Prosser's schema for a right that was violated when
someone's image was attached to a product for financial gain.
Clearly, these public figures were not concerned about "hurt
feelings," but rather hurt finances.2" To appropriate an image
CODE ANN. § 32-13-(1-20) (Michie 1999).
18 William L. Prosser, Privacy,48 CAL. L. REV. 383, 389 (1960).
19 Id.
20 We think that, in addition to and independent of that right of
17 IND.

privacy (which in New York derives from statute), a man has a right in
the publicity value of his photograph, i.e., the right to grant the
exclusive privilege of publishing his picture, and that such a grant
may validly be made "in gross," i.e., without an accompanying transfer
of a business or of anything else. Whether it be labelled a "property"
right is immaterial; for here, as often elsewhere, the tag "property"
simply symbolizes the fact that courts enforce a claim which has
pecuniary worth.
This right might be called a "right of publicity." For it is
common knowledge that many prominent persons (especially actors
and ball-players), far from having their feelings bruised through
public exposure of their likenesses, would feel sorely deprived if they
no longer received money for authorizing advertisements, popularizing
their countenances, displayed in newspapers, magazines, busses,
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to sell a product is not quite a violation of one's right to
privacy, since the subjects generally had been violating their
own privacy right and left-maximizing the economic return
for their personas in their own way.21
Enter the right of publicity, a phrase generally
regarded as coined in Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps
Chewing Gum, Inc.22 and more fully articulated in Melville
Nimmer's seminal article on the subject.' Not a violation of
privacy, and not quite misappropriation of identity-the right
of publicity provided a cause of action to those whose image
had been adopted without their consent, usually to sell a
product.2 4 The Supreme Court later recognized the states'
ability to develop the right of publicity, and since then states
have been tinkering with the concept with strikingly different
results.'
The right of publicity has demonstrated a startling
tenacity, even in the face of sharp criticism. 26 The criticisms
range from First Amendment objections,
to federal
preemption attacks,28 to chicken-little style hand wringing
trains and subways. This right of publicity would usually yield them
no money unless it could be made the subject of an exclusive grant
which barred any other advertiser from using their pictures.
Haelan Labs, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866, 868 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 346 U.S. 816 (1953). See also J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON
TRADEMARKS § 28-6 (1999) ("While infringement of the right of publicity looks
at an injury to the pocketbook, an invasion of appropriation privacy looks to an
injury of the psyche."); Sheldon W. Halpern, The Right of Publicity: Commercial
Exploitation of the Associative Value of Personality, 39 VAND. L. REV. 1199
(1986).
21 Professor Michael Madow provides an exhaustive history of
the invocation
of celebrity in conjunction with the sale of products in America, dating back to the
founding fathers. Michael Madow, PrivateOwnership of Public Image: PopularCulture
and PublicityRights, 81 CAL. L. REV. 125 (1993).
2
202 F.2d at 868.
Melville Nimmer, The Right of Publicity, 19 LAW AND CONTEMP. PROBS.
203 (1954).
24 Haelan Labs, 202 F.2d at 868; see supra
note 20.
Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 573-75.
2G Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Fame, 73 IND. L.J. 1, 14 (1997).
27 Madow, supra note 21; see also Douglas J. Ellis, The Right of Publicity:
EnrichingCelebritiesand the FirstAmendment: A Comment on Why Celebrity Parodies
Are FairGame for Fair Use, 64 U. CIN. L. REV. 575 (1996); Linda J. Stack, White v.
Samsung ElectronicsAmerica, Inc.'s Expansion of the Right of Publicity at the Expense
of FreeSpeech, 89 N.W. L. REV. 1189 (1995).
Baltimore Orioles, Inc. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n, 805 F.2d
663 (7th Cir. 1986); see also Fleet v. CBS, Inc., 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d 645 (Cal. Ct. App.
1996).
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about extending the right to pale impressions of celebrities."
Perhaps the loudest voices belong to those crying out to solve
this insurmountable unpredictability by federal statute.
The staying power of the right can be attributed to its
initial sex appeal. 0 Arguments in favor of advancing the right
range from natural rights based theories, namely the Lockean
ideal of owning the fruits of one's own labors,3 ' the Hegelian
philosophy of personality as property,32 or, most recently, a
Kantian model.33 Economic theories behind the right have
flourished as well, principally stressing the incentives in place
for creativity when the product, the artist himself, is
protected.34 Further, the concept of stability in licensing and
commercial endorsements is key when it is understood that
exclusivity is what gives a persona's attachment to a product
value.3' There is no value in identifying Michael Jordan with
Nike if, in fact, his persona can also be utilized with impunity
by Reebok.3'

The most articulate attack on celebrity overprotection is undoubtedly
Judge Alex Kozinski's dissent filed upon denial of the motion to rehear Vanna White's
claim against Samsung Electronics. White v. Samsung Electronics America, Inc., 989
F.2d 1512, 1514 (9th Cir. 1993) (Kozinski, J., dissenting); see also Aaron A. Bartz,
Comment, ... And Where It Stops, Nobody Knows: California'sExpansive Publicity
Rights Threaten The Federal Copyright System, 27 Sw. U. L. REv. 299 (1997); William
M. Heberer III, Comment, The Overprotection Of Celebrity: A Comment On White V.
Samsung Electronics America, Inc., 22 HOFSTRA L. REV. 729 (1994); Arlen W.
Langvardt, The Troubling Implications of a Right of Publicity "Wheel" Spun Out of
Control, 45 KAN. L. REV. 329 (1997).

""The seductive power of celebrity is overwhelming even to some of America's
most incisive legal minds. See Kwall, supra note 26.
3'Nimmer, supra note 23, at 216; but, c.f Madow, supra note 21, at 181-97;
see, e.g., Uhlaender v. Henricksen, 316 F. Supp. 1277, 1282 (D. Minn. 1970).
32 "1 am what is mine. Personality is the original personal property." NORMAN
0. BROWN, LOVE'S BODY ch. 8 (1967).
33Alice Haemmerli, Whose Who? The Case ForA Kantian Right of Publicity,
49 Duke L. J. 383 (2000).
34 Often, the infringer in a right of publicity case is characterized as "free
riding" on the good will created by another's persona. See Madow, supra note 21, at
196.
35Jim Henson Prod. v. Brady, 867 F. Supp. 175, 189 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (stating
of the right of publicity that "the nature of that property is such that its value is
diluted by unauthorized use.").
3'Id. at 189 n.15.
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Choice of law analysis has changed dramatically since
the 1960s, characterized by a rise in policy-based approaches. 7
Formerly, the accepted method of determining the appropriate
law to apply was to perform a vested rights analysis." Stated
simply, the law to be applied was the law of the place where
the right first "vested."8 Generally, the rule of decision was
provided by the local law of the place where the "last act
necessary to bring a legal obligation into existence" occurred."
Although generally discredited by conflicts scholars, the vested
rights approach is still the primary method of choice of law
decision in "approximately one-third" of the states. 41 Other
states that originally seemed to be moving away from the
vested rights approach have crept back to a more "rulesoriented" approach after dissatisfaction with a more interest
based approach.42
The vested rights theory was thought to be the best
solution to a choice of law problem primarily for its inherent
predictability.43 The rigidity of the rules took the matter of
choice of law out of the discretion of the trial judge, and
minimized the likelihood of "forum shopping." In a tort action,
37 WILLIAM

M. RICHMAN & WILLIAI L. REYNOLDS, UNDERSTANDING
(1993).
§
68
CONFLICT OF LAWS
38 RICHMAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 37, at § 54; see also JOSEPH H. BEALE, A
TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (1935). Beale was creating a framework within
which it was possible to apply the laws of another sovereignty. His work was a reaction
to that of Joseph Story, who articulated choice-of-law principles based on the concept of
"comity". In other words, one state would apply the law of another state out of respect,
at the discretion of the forum judge. The forum judge was thus applying the law of
another state, not creating a new right or a new rule of decision within the forum. See
JOSEPH STORY, CONFLICT OF LAWS (1834).
"9 This is unquestionably an oversimplification. Vested rights analysis
involves a system of rigidly applied rules depending on what area of law is implicated.
RICIHIMAN & REYNOLDS, supranote 37, at § 62-67.
4 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAws, Introductory Note to Topic 1
(1997).
41 RICHMAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 37, at § 63.
42 Neumeier v. Kuehner, 31 N.Y.2d 121, 386 N.E.2d 454, 335 N.Y.S.2d 64
(1972). RICHMAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 37, at § 54; see also Maurice Rosenberg, The
Comeback of Choice of Law Rules, 81 COLUMI. L. REV. 946 (1981).
43 Despite the need for predictability, the price was often rigidity that led to
absurd results. Numerous "escape devices" were developed to circumvent the rigidity of
these rules. REYNOLDS & RICHMAN, supra note 37, at § 55.
4 Rather, the rise of the "interest analyses" to supplant the traditional choice
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the law applied was the place of the wrong.45 In a contract
46
action, the law applied was the law of the "place of making."
In a property action, the rule of decision generally depended on
the "situs"'7 of the property.
Choice of law changed dramatically in the latter half
of the twentieth century. Scholars sought to create a new
methodology that would not have the same rigidity as the
territorial or vested rights approaches.4 8 Two major schools of
thought that greatly influenced modern choice of law practice
are Brainerd Currie's governmental interest analysis and the
"most significant relationship" approach of the Restatement
Second. Currie's approach is to deduce the policies behind the
rule of decision in a particular case.49 When the policies are
assessed under Currie's theory, there is most often no real
conflict. The interests of one state in deciding the matter are
either non-existent or in line with the interests of the other
state. These situations are deemed "false conflicts," and forum
law is applied."
The most significant relationship approach uses
Currie's idea of interest analysis as a factor to be weighed in
determining which state has the most significant relationship
with the transaction. Other factors include: the needs of
interstate and international systems, the forum's relevant
policies, the policies of other states involved, the protection of
justified expectations, the basic policies underlying the specific
of law rules was criticized on the basis that such analyses would lead to forum
shopping. REYNOLDS & RICHMAN, supranote 37, at § 76[a].
45RESTATEMENT (FIRST) CONFLICT OF LAWS § 377 (1934); see also REYNOLDS
& RICHMAN, supra note 37, at §§ 62, 64.
4' RESTATEMENT (FIRST) CONFLICT OF LAWS § 332; RESTATEMENT (SECOND)

CONFLICT OF LAwS, Introductory Note, Ch. 7; see, e.g., Milliken v. Pratt, 125 Mass. 374
(1878).
47 See discussion of "situs," infranotes 58-63 and accompanying
text.
48 Scholars sought to avoid the absurd results that could occur under the
vested rights theory. See, e.g., Ala. Great S. R.R. Co. v. Carroll, 11 So. 803, 809 (Ala.
1892) (determining that plaintiff had no right of action since the injury occurred while
train was operating through Mississippi, even though the negligence took place in
Alabama).
49 Currie first set forth his interest analysis theory in a law review article.
Brainerd Currie, Notes on Methods and Objectives in the Conflict of Laws, 1959 DUKE
L.J. 171, 178. Finding no one pays any attention to law review articles, especially the
footnotes, Currie then published a series of articles in book form. BRAINERD CURRIE,
SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (1963).
50 RICHMAN & REYNOLDS, supranote 37, at § 75.
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area of the law at issue, certainty, predictability and
uniformity of results, and the ease of determining and applying
foreign law. 51 Some factors are more crucial to specific areas of
law than other factors. In contract questions, for example, the
expectations of the parties at the time of the transaction are
key. 2 In tort, the expectations of the parties are generally not
considered because, obviously, no one expects an accident or a
tort to occur.5 3

Whatever changes have occurred in choice of law
approaches, the rules governing property have remained
essentially the same.' The uniformity that the territorial and
vested rights approaches offered to choice of law analyses is
even more important in questions of property than it is in tort
or contract questions.5 In tort questions, the modern
approaches tend to focus on how best to implement the general
policies of a state protecting its own citizens, or the general
policies behind tort law. 6 In property, however, the parties'
expectations and general policies of the forum are both
subservient to the need for certainty in transactions, both of
real property and personalty, called immovables and movables
in conflicts parlance.5 7
Situs is determined differently depending on the
nature of the property question in issue. First, the situs of
immovables is always deemed to be where the property is
located. The situs of movables is governed by different rules
depending on what kind of question is at issue." If the question
is regarding an inter vivos transaction, the situs is generally
the location of the property at the time of the transaction.5 9 If
the question is one of succession on death, the domicile of the
decedent is the situs and controls choice of law questions."
G1RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
52 Id. at § 145, cmt. b.
C3 Id.

CONFLICT OF LAWS §

6.

rA REYNOLDS & RICHMAN, supra note 37, at § 86.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAWS § 222, cmt. b.
rG

Id. at § 145, cmt. b.

57 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF

LAWS § 222, cmt. b.; RICHMAN &
REYNOLDS, supra note 37, at § 66.
" Beyond the scope of this Note is the question of distribution of property
after dissolution of marriage. Family law questions are largely governed by domicile.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAWS.
RICHMAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 37, at §§ 86-87.
GOId.
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Therefore, under traditional choice of law approaches,
the domicile at death of the person whose right of publicity is
at issue should control the question of whether such a right has
survived.6 Clearly, the succession on death questions are
determined by situs law. The situs is the domicile of the
decedent. Therefore, situs should control in such a case.
Interestingly enough, the answer to the question remains the
same under the more progressive theories. An interest-based
analysis will reveal that the state where the decedent was
domiciled has the strongest interest in determining whether or
not the right of publicity survives. 2 The most significant

relationship analysis will also likely find that the domicile of
the decedent should control these questions, since the domicile
is likely to have the most significant relationship to the issuethe human capital of the now-deceased personality asserting
the right. 3
Of course, cases are not decided theoretically. In
practice, choice of law questions regarding descendibility have
not been answered with the kind of uniformity one would
expect under any of these choice of law schemes. First, states
do not necessarily "adopt" a clean version of the approach of
one or another choice of law school." The choice of law analysis
in practice is most often a "mish mash" of different schools of
thought. Such confusion can explain differing results. Second,
there are numerous "escape clauses" in the traditional view
and "defenses" under the more modern view to applying the
law of a foreign state. 65 Third, most of the cases that have
defined the right of publicity have been brought in federal
court. The already dicey questions of choice of law from state to
state are complicated further when a federal court attempts to
guess at an undecided state law question.66 Fourth,
characterization of the main issue in an action is key in any
choice of law scheme, traditional or modern. When the cause of
61 Id.
62 Id.
G3Id.

G4 RICHMAN & REYNOLDS, supranote 37, at § 77.
G5Sometimes called "pervasive problems," concepts used also as "escape
devices" include public policy questions, substance versus procedure questions, renvoi,
depecage, etc. RICHMAN & REYNOLDS, supranote 37, at § 55.
66 See, e.g., Factors, Etc., Inc. v Pro Arts, 579 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1978); see also
Cray, supra note 1.

2001]

CHOICE OF LAWAND THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY

1311

action is characterized as a "tort" action, certain rules apply.
Conversely, when the cause of action is characterized as a
"property" action, other choice of law rules apply.
C.

Choice of Law Difficulties Inherent in Right of
Publicity Cases

Characterization of right of publicity issues is by no
means uniform. In fact, characterization has led to most of the
uncertainty surrounding choice of law approaches and results
in right of publicity cases." In more traditional systems,
characterization operates as a kind of "escape clause"allowing courts to apply a different choice of law rule by
changing the "characterization" of a certain action. A forum
with no right of publicity, and disdain for the cause of action,
could characterize the action as a "tort" action and apply the
law of the "place of the wrong" rather than characterizing it as
a property action governed by situs rules. Federal courts
attempting to determine what a state court would do in the
same situation are often forced to guess at an additional
factor-namely, how does that state court characterize the
right of publicity.68 Characterization is thus an issue in all of
the problem areas leading to disunity in choice of law questions
about the right of publicity.69
The reason for the problem of characterization is the
right of publicity's history. An outgrowth from the tort of
invasion of privacy, the right of publicity has found it difficult
to shed its tort skin. In practice, the right of publicity operates
as a property right. Damages are not sought for personal
injury, but for the injuriousness of appropriating an image for
financial gain. Essentially, the tort that these actions most
closely resemble is conversion-the conversion of one's image,
or one's personality. The first element in an action for
conversion is that the litigant alleging conversion must prove
McCARTHY, supra note 2, at § 11:8.
CSMcFarland v. Miller, 14 F.3d 912, 917 (3d Cir. 1994).
C9 In an early leading case concerning the descendibility of the right of
publicity, the California Supreme Court deemed the question of characterization
"pointless." Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 603 P.2d. 425, 428 (1979). However, later
cases highlighted the essential quality of the inquiry in terms of choice of law. See, e.g.,
Acme Circus v. Kuperstock, 711 F.2d. 1538, 1541 n.1 (11th Cir. 1983).
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that she is the legal owner of the subject matter of the
litigation. The Restatement directs that these first questions in
an action for conversion be answered by the section of rules
governing property. 7 Therefore, under the Restatement, the
question of whether a right of publicity exists or not, and thus
whether it is capable of being "converted," should be defined by
property choice of law principles.
Applying property principles to the question of the
rights' existence is inherently logical. Essentially, the question
is, does the forum recognize the individual's right to own
certain essential elements of his or her demeanor, personality,
etc.? If the forum does recognize that right, then it is possible
to convert that ownership and the right of publicity action
survives. If not, the question of damages for converting the
right of publicity is moot.7' How do courts determine whether
the litigant asserting the right of publicity has such a right?72
While questions about how such a right should be enforced or
how damages should be measured might be answered by
applying the forum's traditional or modern choice of law
analysis, the threshold question of whether such a right exists
should be determined by a hard and fast rule, like domicile.73
The rule of domicile determining descendibility is
easily applied with predictable, uniform results. The problem
of characterization is no longer present because once the right's
claimant is deceased, courts have no difficulty analyzing the
cause of action using property choice of law principles. The case
has clearly left the bounds of the right of privacy, where the
damage is hurt feelings and loss of dignity, and is firmly in the
realm of pecuniary loss when the estate brings the action on
behalf of the decedent. The garden-variety right of publicity
70 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAWS § 147,
cmt. i.
71

One cannot steal something that does not exist. Such a theft is akin to the

sound of one hand clapping. This bifurcated approach is also followed in cases outside
of New York and California applying those state's laws. Joplin Enter. v. Allen, 795 F.
Supp. 349, 350-51 (W.D. Wash. 1992).
72 Constitutionally, a forum cannot bar a cause of action it itself
recognizes.
Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U.S. 613, 613 (1951). However, a forum cannot apply its own law
if it has no substantial contacts with the cause of action. Home Ins. v. Dick, 281 U.S.
397, 410 (1930).
Although some would certainly argue that domicile is far from a "hard and
fast" rule, it is certainly the best touchstone available to conflicts sufferers. Domicile is
a flexible concept, but is generally determinable. The rule system that has emerged for
determining domicile at least gives one a place to start.
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case, brought while the claimant is still alive, could benefit
greatly from the domicile touchstone in terms of predictability
and uniformity. While traditional choice of law analysis would
still define the scope of the rule, whether or not the right exists
would be determined by the claimant's domicile.74
Domicile also provides a much needed check on broad
statutes that claim to protect the rights of anyone asserting a
claim, regardless of their contact with the forum. Indiana, for
example, has a right of publicity statute that protects people
within one hundred years of their death, regardless of their
contacts with Indiana.7 5 In other words, a representative of the
estate of Mark Twain, Humphrey Bogart, Walt Disney, Babe
Ruth, Tupac Shakur, or any other prominent figure could make
a prime facie case in Indiana.7 6 The contacts, or lack thereof, of
these figures with Indiana are explicitly irrelevant under that
statute's protections.77 A domicile touchstone could reign in
these overbroad protections, while still permitting claimants to
control their own destinies by seeking out the protections of
these statutes while living.
DoMICILE AND DESCENDIBILITY IN PRACTICE

II.

This Part examines recent cases in California and New
York concerning the descendibility of right of publicity, and
assesses the effectiveness of the domicile rule in both forums.
California explicitly provides a statutory scheme for the
recognition of right of publicity after death,7" while New York
has cryptically rejected the idea of survivability.79 Both states
7
5

Acme Circus, 711 F.2d at 1541.
IND. CODE ANN. § 32-13 (1-20) (Michie 1999).

76 Interestingly, the estates of both Humphrey Bogart and Babe Ruth have
licensed all of their publicity rights to the Curtis Management Group (CMG), a
prominent figure in the licensing of deceased celebrities. CMG also represents the
interests of Marilyn Monroe, Mickey Mantle, James Dean, and countless other icons.
See http:J/www.cmgww.com (last visited Oct. 12, 2001). Curtis Management Group
enjoys the protection of the broad Indiana statute since it is headquartered in
Indianapolis. Therefore, as an Indiana domiciliary, it would continue to do so in terms
of recognition of the rights under a domicile-controlled choice of law rule. However, the
scope of the rule-whether it indeed extends for 100 years after death, etc.-would be
determined by traditional choice of law analysis.
7 IND. CODE ANN. §32-13-1(a).
78 CAL CIV. CODE § 3344.1 (Deering 2000).
71 Stephano v. News Group Pub., 64 N.Y.2d 174, 183, 474 N.E.2d 580, 584,
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have ultimately concluded that a bifurcated approach is
necessary to first establish whether the right exists based on
the claimant's domicile, and then to determine its scope by the
applicable choice of law interest analysis. 0
A.

Descendibilityand Choice of Law in California

California enacted § 990 of its civil code in direct
contradiction to a judicial determination that the right of
publicity was not descendible.8 s As of January 1, 2000, the
statute has been renumbered, dubbed the Astaire Celebrity
Image Protection Act, and its protections extended to last up to
seventy years after death. The statute provides that a
successor in interest must register as such with the Secretary
of State in order to bring an action under the statute. 2 A
deceased personality under the statute is someone whose
"name, voice, signature, photograph, or likeness" had
commercial value at the time of his or her death." The
commercial value can exist regardless of whether that deceased
personality elected to capitalize on that value while living.'
The statute itself makes no mention of the claimant's
domicile.85 The sparse case law applying the statute, however,
has put domicile center stage in choice of law questions. In
Lord Simon Cairns v. Franklin Mint Co., the United States
District Court for the Central District of California addressed
choice of law in relation to § 990 for the first time. 6 Plaintiffs
were the trustees for the estate of the late Princess Diana.
Defendants had filed for a series of trademarks involving
485 N.Y.S.2d 220, 224 (1984) (determining that the right of publicity in New York is
limited to that provided by statute).
8" See sources cited, supranote 15.
81 Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 603 P.2d 425 (Cal.
1979).
CAL. CIV.CODE § 3344.1.
Id. at § 3344.1(a)(1).
84 Id.
This is in spite of the fact that domicile was much discussed in the debate
surrounding the statute's enactment. See Lord Simon Cairns v. Franklin Mint Co., 120
F. Supp. 2d 880, 884-86 (C.D. Cal. 2000) [hereinafter Cairns I1].
24 F. Supp. 2d 1013, 1024 (C.D. Cal. 1998) [hereinafter Cairns1].Because §
990 was the statute in effect when the case was decided, references in the text still
refer to the statute by that number. It has now been renumbered as CAL. CIV. CODE §
3344.1 so that it now follows its cousin for the living, § 3344.
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Diana's name," and had further sold and promoted various
items depicting the name and image of Princess Diana without
authorization of the estate.' Among other complaints,89
plaintiffs alleged that defendants had violated Princess Diana's
statutory right to publicity under California Civil Code § 990.
The first issue for the court was whether or not
Diana's right to publicity existed under § 990. Certainly, on its
face, the statute gives no indication that it is intended to be
limited to California domiciliaries. 0 The successors-in-interest
to Princess Diana's estate complied with § 990's registration
requirements. 91 Defendants, however, asserted that the
question of whether Diana's right to publicity existed was
governed by the law of her domicile at the time of her death Great Britain.92 Great Britain does not recognize the right to
publicity. 93 Therefore, the defendants urged, despite compliance
with § 990, Diana's right of publicity did not survive her death.
Although California utilizes a version of Currie's
"governmental interest" analysis to settle choice of law
questions,94 defendants here asserted that California Civil Code
§ 946 controlled. 95 California Civil Code § 946 provides that, in
a question of personal property, "if there is no law to the
contrary, in the place where the property is situated, it is
deemed to follow the person of its owner, and is governed by
the law of his domicile."" The court agreed that this statute
' Id. at 1022.
Id. The items included a "Diana, Princess of Wales Porcelain Portrait Doll,"
a "Diana, Queen of Hearts Jeweled Tribute Ring," a "Diana, England's Rose Diamond
Pendant," a "Princess Diana Tiara Ring," an "England's Rose Heirloom Collector's
Plate," a "Diana, The People's Princess Doll," a "Princess Diana Crown Ring," and the
"Diana, Forever Sparkling Classic Drop Earrings." Not surprisingly, the advertising
and packaging for these items featured the name and likeness of Princess Diana. Id.
9 Plaintiffs also asserted claims of false designation of origin under the
Lanham Act, of federal trademark dilution under 15 U.S.C. § 1125, false advertising
under the Lanham Act, and unfair competition and misleading advertising in violation
of California Business and Professions Code. CairnsI, 24 F. Supp. 2d at 1022.
' Id. at 1029.
Id. at 1021. The successors filed on September 30, 1997-approximately
one month after Diana's death on August 31, 1997.
D2 Id. at 1025.
' Id. at 1023; Bi-Rite Enter. Inc. v. Bruce Miner Co., 757 F.2d 440, 442 (1st
Cir. 1985); see also MCCARTHY, supra note 2, at § 6.21.
04 Cairns1, 24 F. Supp. 2d at 1024 (citations omitted).
" Id. at 1025.
16 Id. (quoting CAL. CIV. CODE § 946 ("By what law governed ....
If there is
no law to the contrary, in the place where personal property is situated, it is deemed to
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controlled, and that Diana's domicile at death determined the
question of whether her right of publicity survived. Since Great
Britain does not recognize such a right, plaintiffs § 990 claim
failed.
Effectively, this federal court limited California's
statute to California domiciliaries or domiciliaries of one of the
other twenty-four states that recognize some form of a right of
publicity. While the power of a federal court to define the scope
of state right of publicity laws is uncontroverted, 97 federal
courts have not had much success in terms of the staying
power of their interpretations.98 This district court, however,
had the benefit of experience. Having seen the development of
the right of publicity, especially in the area of descendibility,"
the court made an excellent argument for deciding questions of
whether or not the right of publicity exists based primarily on
the domicile of the decedent.
First, the court characterized the rule in § 946 as the
"traditional common law rule" sometimes called "mobilia
sequuntur personam."" ° In other words, intangible personal
property is found at the domicile of its owner, unless, as § 946
provides, some exception applies to that general rule."' The
court struggled with this idea of an exception. Since § 946 itself
provides that the situs of the property is the domicile of its
owner, what exception could there be that situates the property

follow the person of its owner, and is governed by the law of his domicile.")).
9
In fact, much of the development of the right of publicity has taken place in
the federal courts. The ease of tacking on a state right of publicity claim to other
"federal question" claims under the Lanham Act and federal trademark statutes has
often put the federal courts in the awkward position of determining questions of first
impression regarding the right of publicity, often with quickly reversed results. See
supra note 76.
'8 The interplay regarding questions of descendibility between the federal
circuits and their respective highest state courts, not to mention each other, is almost
comical in scope. Witness the "Elvis is Alive-or not. .. ." controversy as it plays out in
the following cases. See, e.g., Factors, Etc. Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc. 652 F.2d 278 (2d Cir.
1981); Memphis Dev. Found. v. Factors, Etc., Inc., 616 F.2d 956 (6th Cir. 1980); State
of Tennessee ex rel The Elvis Presley Mem'l Found. v. Crowell, 733 S.W.2d 89 (Tenn.
1987).
9sCairns I, 24 F. Supp. 2d at 1025. Following Acme Circus Operating Co.,
Inc. v. Kuperstock, 711 F.2d. 1538 (11th Cir. 1983). Also, citing McCarthys comments
on the "Elvis Presley" and "Marx Brothers" cases. MCCARTHY, supra note 2.
1*0 CairnsI, 24 F. Supp. 2d at 1026 (citations omitted).
101 Id.
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else?1 2

somewhere
First, the court deemed that it must
determine where the property is situated for the purposes of
the § 946 exception, and then whether there is law to the
contrary in that forum. To straighten out this analytical
pretzel, the court assumed first, for the purpose of assessing
whether there is law to the contrary, that the general rule did
not apply and that the property was situated in California."3
Unfortunately for the plaintiffs, the only abrogation of the
general rule defining domicile as the controlling factor dealt
with in rem jurisdiction, and not the question of whether a
property right existed in the first place.0 4 This distinction
proved fatal, and the court found no "law to the contrary" in
California sufficient to eradicate the general rule that domicile
controlled. Therefore, even assuming that the property was
situated in California, there was no "contrary law" to rescue
the claim from the fatal domicile rule. Further, the court
emphasized that there is nothing in § 990 that takes that
statute out from under the umbrella of § 946. If the legislature
had fully intended for domicile not to control the disposition of
the right of publicity, it certainly could have included an
exception to § 946 within the text of § 990.05

Plaintiffs' two final efforts to revive Diana's right of
publicity claim met similar fates. First, plaintiffs claimed that
the situs of the property was in California because that was
where the registration certificate was filed. Second, plaintiffs
claimed that the interest in the right of publicity was an
existing chose in action governed by California law. The court,
however, was unconvinced by both claims. The registration
form do&s not embody the right, but simply serves to give
notice of the intent to claim the right.0 6 The claim that Diana's
right of publicity was a chose in action failed because the right
never came into existence. Since the choice of law question

1* This self-reflective circle is common in conflicts. Like the ancient symbol

for eternity, the snake is eating its own tail. While not a pure renvoi situation, this
statute's reflecting on itself is a version of that conflicts phenomenon. See RICHMAN &

REYNOLDS, supra note 37, at § 58.
10 CairnsI, 24 F. Supp. 2d at 1026.
Id.
...Id. at 1027.
104

'*oId. at 1028.
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effectively nullified the right from ever having vested, there
was no chose in action to assert.' °'
Essentially, the Cairns I court judicially established
that the first step in applying the California right of publicity
statute dealing with deceased personalities was to assess
whether that personality has such a right according to the law
of her domicile at the time of death. The court was careful to
limit this holding to § 990 and distinguished it from its
California Civil Code cousin for the living, § 3344."8 The court
noted, however, that cases based on § 3344 have typically
selected the law of the property owner's domicile under the
governmental interests test. 9
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit approved of
the district court's approach in an unpublished decision. 1 "
Specifically, the circuit court held that the district court
correctly found that § 990 was properly modified by the
provisions of § 946. First, the court noted that § 990 contains
no choice of law provision. Second, and "perhaps most
compelling," the Ninth Circuit was swayed by the district
court's reliance on Acme Circus v. Kuperstock."' Section 990
was enacted a year after the Acme Circus decision, which held
that right of publicity claims were determined under the rubric
of § 946.2 If the legislature had intended to correct this
assumption, surely it would have provided explicitly that § 946
does not apply.
Interestingly, the court, relying on an earlier
legislative draft, went on to note that § 990 had been amended
to include a choice of law provision effective January 1, 2000,
that extends the right to descendants of celebrities not
domiciled in California at the time of death.' However, the
...
Id. at 1027.
'o8Cairns1, 24 F. Supp. 2d at 1028 n.11.
,"'Id. (citing Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460, 463 (9th Cir. 1988));
Fleury v. Harper & Row Pub., Inc. 698 F.2d 1022 (9th Cir. 1983); Motschenbacher v.
R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 498 F.2d 821, 825-26 (9th Cir. 1974); Page v. Something
Weird Video, 908 F. Supp. 714, 716 (C.D. Cal. 1995); see also Joplin Enter. v. Allen, 795
F. Supp. 349 (W.D. Wash. 1992).
110 Diana Princess of Wales Mem'l Fund v. Franklin Mint Co., Inc., 216 F.3d
1082 (9th Cir. 1999).
711 F.2d 1538 (1983).
...
112Acme Circus,711 F.2d. at 1538.
113Specifically, the court states: "[T]he California legislature has amended
Section 990, effective January 1, 2000, to expressly include a choice-of-law provision
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final version of the amended statute, now § 3344.1, does not
include such an express choice of law provision. The statute,
now called the Astaire Celebrity Image Protection Act,
primarily extends the term of protection to seventy years after
death."' Also, the amendment requires the Secretary of State
to post claimant's registrations on the World Wide Web,
providing for better access and notice to potential users."'
The only provision that could possibly affect choice of
law provisions is revised section (n), which states, "This section
shall apply to the adjudication of liability and the imposition of
any damages or other remedies in cases in which the liability,
damages, and other remedies arise from acts occurring directly
in this state.""6 While this provision requires that the
infringement take place within the state of California, it is
clearly more of a jurisdictional provision than a modification of
who may bring such an action. This provision is insufficient to
constitute a "law to the contrary" under the provisions of § 946.
estate were
of Diana's
representatives
The
reinvigorated by the language in the Ninth Circuit's opinion
stating that the amended statute contained a choice of law
provision. The estate made the above argument surrounding
section (n) and moved to reinstate their right of publicity claim
before the district judge. However, Judge Paez clarified that
the Ninth Circuit was most likely responding to the legislative
history surrounding the provision, and not the final draft of the
statute. Judge Paez correctly construed section (n) as a
jurisdictional provision, not a choice of law provision.'
The provisions of § 946 state that the place where the
property is situated may control personal property if there is
some law to the contrary there. If not, the general rule of
domicile controlling property governs. There is nothing in the
section (n) provision requiring infringement action to take
that expands coverage of the statute to heirs of celebrities who were not domiciliaries
of California at the time of death." Diana Princess of Wales Mem'l Fund v. The
Franklin Mint Co., Inc. 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 34568, *4 (9th Cir. 1999). This language
was later stricken from the opinion. See Diana Princess of Wales Mem'l Fund v. The
Franklin Mint Co., Inc. 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 2847. The original opinion relied on an
earlier draft of the legislation. See discussion in this part, supra.
114 CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344.1(h).
...Id. at § 3344. 1(f)(3).
16 CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344.1(n).
17 Cairns II, 120 F. Supp. 2d at 882-83.
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place in California that takes the cause of action out of the
§ 946 umbrella in terms of conflicts principles. Even assuming
that the right of publicity is "situated" in California, the
provision in the amended statute does not provide a "law to the
contrary" as to what law controls. It merely states that the law
applies to infringement actions taking place within the state of
California.
Judge Paez's opinion denying the reinstatement of
plaintiffs right of publicity claim clearly explains both the
legislative history surrounding the question of whether or not
to include a choice of law provision in the amended statute, and
details an interesting colloquy between the district court and
the Ninth Circuit that ultimately led the Circuit Court to
amend its opinion. First, as to the question of whether to
include a choice of law provision, the district court explained
that early drafts included a provision, much like Indiana's,
that § 3344.1 would apply regardless of the claimant's
domicile. 8 Senator Burton, the amendment's proponent, was
motivated by, among other things, the desire to legislatively
overturn the decision in Cairns . However, Senator Burton
accepted successive amendments that eliminated the
"regardless of domicile" choice of law provision. As Judge Paez
described:
Assembly Member Kuehl explained that this language had been
deleted in order to maintain neutrality on the choice-of-law issue.
Specifically, Kuehl said, "[wie somewhat (sic) with notable lack of
courage, I think, decided not to jump into that question because, at
the moment, the law does not either require one to be a
not require this or
domiciliary-at least in the statutory law-does
far. 120
not require this. I didn't want to go that

Furthermore, Judge Paez demonstrated that the
Ninth Circuit relied on an earlier draft of the statute when it
stated, in the course of affirming his CairnsI decision, that the
newly amended statute contained a choice of law provision.
The Ninth Circuit cited to a draft that included the provision."'
In response to that decision and specifically that dicta within
1

8Id. at 884.
'9 Id. at 884 n.2.
0
12 Id. at 884.
121S. 209, 1999 Legis. Sess. (Cal. 1999).

2001]

CHOICE OF LAW AND THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY

1321

it, Judge Paez issued a minute order postponing the resolution
of the plaintiffs motion to reinstate pending the Ninth Circuit's
ruling on the defendant's petition for rehearing. In that minute
order, Judge Paez stated:
The Ninth Circuit characterized a recent amendment, effective
January 1, 2000, to California's right to publicity statute.., as a
"choice of law provision." The Court may have to consider whether
the new amendment is a choice-of-law provision in order to rule on
the pending motion. Upon a review of the parties' papers, the text of
the amended statute, and its legislative history, it appears to the
1 22
Court that this new provision may not be a choice of law provision.

"In response," Judge Paez concluded, "the Ninth Circuit
panel issued an order amending its previous ruling to delete
the words 'choice of law' but otherwise denying the petition for
rehearing. " "I
In sum, the amendments reinforce, rather than
negatively impact, the decision in Cairns I. Efforts to
legislatively overrule the decision were considered and
ultimately defeated. The Ninth Circuit's unpublished
affirmance ultimately deleted the earlier dicta professing that
the amended statute contained such a provision. Therefore, the
Cairns decision stands as a means of settling the issue of
descendibility in California, and perhaps indicates the wave of
the future in determining the disposition of right of publicity
claims for living plaintiffs.
B.

Descendibility and Choice of Law in New York

The New York right of publicity is also controlled by
statute, although it is termed the right of privacy. New York
Civil Rights Law §§ 50 and 51 explicitly limit recovery to living
persons. 24 In the late 1970s and early 1980s, representatives of
deceased celebrities had some success in the federal district
122 Cairns II,

120 F. Supp. 2d at 886. The decision of Judge Paez also details

the persuasive reasons provided by several prominent law professors for not including
a provision in the statute that specifically ignores domicile. These reasons include the
provision's likely unconstitutionality and, "of interest to the court" the fact that
California '%as no legitimate interest in protecting deceased non-California
celebrities." Id. at 886.
123 id.

1'2N.Y.

Civ.

RIGHTs L. §§ 50, 51.
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court at widening the protection to include the possibility of a
"common law" right of publicity.' 2' Theoretically, this "common
law" right provided protection after death.' 2' After the district
courts twice found a common law right of publicity that was
descendible, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit twice
applied a choice of law analysis and determined that another
state's right of publicity law controlled. 2 While the circuit
court's holdings did not explicitly overrule the district court's
finding of descendibility, it also did not substantiate that
finding.' 2' Not until almost twenty years later did New York's
highest court provide any guidance as to the descendibility
question, and then only by cryptically limiting the New York
right of publicity to its statutory definition, which is limited to
living persons.29 Later, the New York Court of Appeals
somewhat clarified its position on descendiblity-by not
passing on the question in Southeast Bank v. Lawrence.'3 °
Although embarrassing, the fact that the district
courts reached the "wrong" answer in determining whether the
right is descendible did not create confusion. Indeed, the
confusion was there before the district courts passed on it. The
confusion was there after the Second Circuit declined to rule on
the question when it was no longer properly before the court.
Actually, in Factors v. ProArts,"' the choice of law analysis

'2 Groucho Marx Prod. v. Day and Night Co., 689 F.2d 317 (2d Cir. 1982);
Factors, 579 F.2d 278. These two early choice of law analyses cases were examined
contemporaneously in Cray, supra note 1. The facts of each case and procedural history
are articulately covered in that work.
New York's right of publicity is encompassed in the "right to privacy"
statutes which apply only to living people. Therefore, in order to deem the right
descendible, it had to be a "common law" right.
127Factors,579 F.2d at 282-83; Groucho, 689 F.2d at 319.
1 Factors,579 F.2d at 283 n.8; Groucho, 689 F.2d at 319.
'2'Stephano v. News Group Pub., 64 N.Y.2d 174, 183, 474 N.E.2d 580, 584,
485 N.Y.S.2d 220, 224 (1984).
130Applying Florida law, the law of Williams' domicile, the Court of Appeals
determined that Tennessee Williams did not have an enforceable property right in his
"right of publicity." The court then stated, "In light of this holding, we do not pass upon
the question of whether a common-law descendible right of publicity exists in this
State." Southeast Bank, N.A. v. Lawrence, 66 N.Y.2d 910, 912, 489 N.E.2d 744, 745,
498 N.Y.S.2d 775, 776 (1985).
1 1 579 F.2d 278.
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entered the picture rather late, at the appellate stage, as a
means
of trying to straighten out the confusion-not add to
132
it.
In both cases, the Second Circuit looked primarily to
domicile in determining what law to apply. 133 In Factors,
Presley's Tennessee domicile was a strong argument that
Tennessee law should apply." Even if New York law controlled
any aspect of the scope of that right, the Second Circuit held
that in line with the Restatement on Conflict of Laws domicile
should control whether the right actually exists. 1 Similarly, in
Groucho, the district court had applied New York law. The
Second Circuit, instead, applied the law of the Marx Brothers'
domicile at death, California."4
Examining the confusion on descendibility in New
York provides more evidence of the danger inherent in
interpretation of the state right of publicity statutes by federal
courts. The danger of a federal district court interpreting the
law of the state in which it sits on a question that has yet to
reach the state courts is risky enough. Factors, however, was
forced to spin the analysis out even further. Confronted with a
recent Sixth Circuit ruling that the right of publicity was not
descendible under Tennessee law, the court was forced to
confront the question of how much persuasive authority
another circuit's interpretation of state law should be given.
The Tennessee state courts had yet to answer the question of
descendibility. The Sixth Circuit extrapolated that when
confronted with the question, the Tennessee courts would
likely answer in the negative." 7 Ultimately, the Factors court
went along with the Sixth Circuit's interpretation.

112 "Curiously, the choice of law issue had received no attention from the
parties in this litigation. .. ." Factors, 652 F.2d at 280.
" Id. at 280-81.
14 Id. at 281; Groucho, 689 F.2d at 318.
125 Factors,652 F.2d at 281.
13GGroucho, 689 F.2d at 320.
137The Sixth Circuit panel had obviously never been to Graceland. In fact,

when the question was finally before Tennessee's highest court, the rights of Memphis'
favorite son were resuscitated. The Court held that the right was descendible, thus
insuring that Elvis' licensees and, not to mention, his daughter Lisa Marie, will
continue to benefit from the King's substantial celebrity good will. The State of
Tennessee ex. rel. The Elvis Presley Mem'l Found. v. Crowell, 733 S.W.2d 89, 97-99
(1987); see also supra note 97.
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While there was considerable confusion en route to the
current established law, and, some would argue, there is still
considerable room for clarification, the current wisdom is that
New York does not recognize descendibility.138 However, this
has not stopped the courts from recognizing such a descendible
right when the complainant is domiciled in a place where
descendibility is recognized.139 Also, the fact that the courts
looked to domicile as a controlling factor in determining
whether the right existed was not the cause of the confusion.
The inherent cause, implicated in any interplay between the
federal and state court systems on an issue of first impression,
was uncertainty as to the state's substantive law. This
uncertainty was not due to a weakness in the choice of law
analyses performed, but the inherent weakness of a judicial
system attempting to act as a legislator.
In fact, the choice of law analyses performed in Factors
and Groucho were identical to those performed in the later
state cases clarifying the New York position. As in the federal
courts, the New York Court of Appeals looked to domicile to
control the question of descendibility-or, in other words, the
question of whether or not the right of publicity still existed. "'
The logic of Factors and Groucho was not questioned on this
point. The defining decisions of Stephano v. News Group
Publications' and Southeast Bank v. Lawrence... further
articulated the New York position on first, the question of
descendibility, and second, the choice of law analysis to be
applied. Stephano clarified that "no common law right of
publicity" exists in New York."' Southeast Bank, on the other
hand, confirmed that New York looks to domicile to determine
if personal property exists, and therefore to determine whether
a right of publicity exists.4
138 Pirone v. MacAillan, Inc., 894 F.2d 579, 586 (2d Cir.
1990).
131

Jim Henson Prod. v. Brady, 867 F. Supp 175, 189 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (holding

that Connecticut would recognize a descendible right of publicity).
140 Southeast Bank, N.A. v Lawrence, 66 N.Y.2d 910, 489 N.E.2d 744, 498
N.Y.S.2d 775 (1985).
1
64 N.Y.2d 174, 474 N.E.2d 580, 485 N.Y.S.2d 220 (1984).
142 66 N.Y.2d 910, 489 N.E.2d 744, 498 N.Y.S.2d 775 (1985).
143 Stephano, 64 N.Y.2d at 185, 474 N.E.2d at 584, 498 N.Y.S.2d
at 776.
144 Southeast Bank, N.A, 66 N.Y.2d at 912, 489 N.E.2d at 745, 498 N.Y.S.2d
at
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Some might say that this argument proves too much,
that if a domicile rule did not create the confusion, neithei did
it resolve it. While resolution and clear answers are desirable,
perfect clarity is not always possible. A clear domicilecontrolling rule in choice of law questions regarding the right
of publicity provides a neutral principle necessary to answer
the initial question of whether the right ever came into
existence. The scope of the right will still be affected by the
controlling state's approach to choice of law questions. If a
state has chosen the "most significant relationship" approach,
that approach can determine the correct law to apply in
enforcing the right. Domicile would merely address the
question of the right ever coming into being. The aim is not to
answer every question, but merely to answer the first and
arguably most important one.
There is case law sufficient to suggest that New York
has already extended the domicile control as a threshold
question to all right of publicity cases. In Rogers v. Grimaldi,4 '
the Second Circuit sitting in diversity looked to the plaintiffs
domicile to determine the existence of her right of publicity.146
The state courts have not yet determined whether the
bifurcated approach will be applied with success to living
plaintiffs. However, there is no indication that the Second
Circuit misinterpreted the direction in which the right of
publicity is headed.

III.

DOMICILE CONTROLS IMPOSED ANSWER OVERBREADTH
CONCERNS RAISED BY UNTESTED EXPANSIVE RIGHT OF

PUBLICITY STATUTES
In recent years, many state legislatures have enacted
right of publicity statutes affording broad protection to
recognizable personalities. For example, Indiana enacted §§ 120 of its property law, devoting an entire chapter of its
14S 875 F.2d 994 (2d Cir. 1989).

G The New York Court of Appeals has clearly stated that "right of publicity"
claims are governed by the substantive law of the plaintiffs domicile because rights of
publicity constitute personalty. Southeast Bank, 66 N.Y.2d at 912, 489 N.E.2d at 745,
498 N.Y.S.2d at 776 (1985). The Second Circuit later extrapolated this New York rule
to include living plaintiffs as well. Rogers, v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d at 1002 ("Rogers is an
Oregon domiciliary, and thus Oregon law governs this claim.").
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legislation to the creation of an expansive right of publicity.
The statute clearly sets out in its first line that it applies as
against any prohibited activity occurring in Indiana, regardless
of the complainant's domicile.'47 Moreover, the statute applies
to any personality living or deceased for fewer than one
hundred years. 14' Further, the statute purports to dictate the
right of publicity policies of other states. Title 32, article 13,
chapter 1, section 16, clause 6 proclaims that the property
rights in the right of publicity are descendible, regardless of
whether the state administering the estate and property of an
intestate deceased personality recognizes the property rights
set forth under the chapter. Without a domicile control, the
Indiana statute runs afoul of the Constitution in several ways.
This Section uses hypotheticals to illustrate the manner in
which the statute exceeds Indiana's legislative power.
Assume that a small feminist publishing company
called Her Voice, Inc., incorporated and headquartered in New
York, prints an advertisement for its services in Ms. Magazine
depicting Susan B. Anthony. The caption reads, "She gave us
our voice. Don't forget to use it." Ms. Magazine's national
subscription base and distribution carries the advertisement
over the Indiana state line. As it happens, under these facts
both Ms. Magazine and Her Voice, Inc. have violated Indiana's
right of publicity statute.
The advertisement fits the proscribed "commercial
purpose" definition outlined in the statute, falling under none
of its set forth exceptions.' Anthony is a "personality" as
defined by the statute. Even if the advertisement depicted a
sketch of her image, not a photograph, it would still run afoul
of her Indiana right of publicity. " The advertisement does her
this disservice in Indiana even though Ms. Anthony never
authorized the use of her right of publicity during her
lifetime."'
It is altogether possible that Her Voice. Inc. ran the
advertisement without any research at all into Ms. Anthony's
right of publicity. Often, publicity rights are stepped on when
47 IND. CODE

§ 32-13-1-1(a) (Michie 1999).

IND. CODE § 32-13-1-8 (Michie 1999).
IND. CODE § 32-13(1-20) (Michie 1999).
1 O Id.
'4.
"

"' See supra note 110.
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an organization simply assumes that a personality has fallen
into the public domain. However, assume that Her Voice, Inc.
has a competent in-house counsel who conducted some
research prior to the advertisement's publication. That
research would have revealed that, at her death, Anthony was
domiciled in New York. Further, the research would have also
revealed that New York does not recognize a descendible right
of publicity. A rudimentary analysis of the choice of law issues
involved would lead a practitioner to believe that Anthony's
rights of publicity in the advertisement would be controlled by
New York law, considering all of the factors taking place there.
In fact, the advertisement may not raise an eyebrow in
any other jurisdiction. However, Indiana would permit an
action under its expansive statute. Susan B. Anthony died in
1906, bringing her well within Indiana's one-hundred-year
umbrella. Of course, whether Ms. Anthony ever traveled
through Indiana is irrelevant, since the statute's first principle
is that it should apply regardless of domicile. Assuming
someone turns up who can assert a claim under its statutory
guidelines, Indiana's statute allows full usurpation of
traditional choice of law guidelines in determining whether the
right of publicity exists.
First, assume Anthony died intestate. Under
traditional choice of law rules, her property would be divided
according to New York law-the law of her domicile at death.
Since New York does not recognize a descendible right of
publicity, the right of publicity would not pass to her heirs.
However, Indiana solves that problem for the prospective
litigant. Indiana Code § 32-13-1-16(6) recognizes the right of
publicity even if New York, the state administering Anthony's
estate and property, does not. Therefore, a distant relative
could suddenly come into a windfall she never expected under
the New York legislative scheme.
Indiana does not have the power to legislate rights of
publicity into existence in New York regardless of New York
law. The statute, on the one hand, concedes that New York is
the state that controls the administration of Anthony's
property, including her right of publicity. On the other hand, it
asserts that Indiana has the power to determine that a right of
publicity exists even when the state controlling the intestate
succession of that personalty does not recognize the
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descendible right. Surely this violates New York's legislative
power. If New York does not wish to recognize a descendible
right of publicity, as it has clearly determined on numerous
occasions, Indiana, a state with little or no contact with this
cause of action, cannot give rise to one.152
Further, the fact that Indiana's expansive statute bars
the entry of this advertisement across its state lines has
dormant Copyright Clause implications.'5 3 Judge Alex Kozinski
of the Ninth Circuit foresaw such dormant Copyright Clause
implications in broad rights of publicity in his dissent in White
v. Samsung Electronics:
Under the dormant Copyright Clause, state intellectual property
laws can stand only so long as they don't "prejudice the interests of
other States." Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 558, 37 L. Ed. 2d
163, 93 S. Ct. 2303 (1973). A state law criminalizing record piracy,
for instance, is permissible because citizens of other states would
"remain free to copy within their borders those works which may be
protected elsewhere." Id. But the right of publicity isn't
geographically limited. A right of publicity created by one state
applies to conduct everywhere, so long as it involves a celebrity
domiciled in that state. If a Wyoming resident creates an ad that
features a California domiciliary's name or likeness, hell be subject
to California right of publicity law even if he's careful to keep the ad
from being shown in California. See Acme Circus Operating Co. v.
Kuperstock, 711 F.2d 1538, 1540 (11th Cir. 1983); Groucho Marx
Prods. v. Day and Night Co., 689 F.2d 317, 320 (2d Cir. 1982); see
also Factors Etc. v. Pro Arts, 652 F.2d 278, 281 (2d Cir. 1981). The
broader and more ill-defined one state's right of publicity, the more
other states.L4
it interferes with the legitimate interests of

Indiana does not have the power
interests of other states with its expansive
statute.15 5 As the statute stands now, the
states' interests and citizens is direct and

to prejudice the
right of publicity
burden on other
significant.15 For

152The contact required in order to provide a forum for a cause of action is

expansive under the Constitution. See supra note 72.
' IND. CODE § 32-13-1 (8,9) (Michie 1999).
104 White v. Samsung Electronics America, Inc., 989 F.2d 1512, 1518-19 (9th
Cir. 1993). Judge Kozinski considered the possibility that a broad right of publicity
could run afoul of other state's interests even if it contained, as he assumes it does, an
internal domicile control. Surely a broad statute, such as Indiana's, which expressly
rejects such a control, is even more of a problem. Id.
...Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 558 (1973).
'5GIn an argument that is beyond the scope of this Note, it should be noted
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example, if this statute was allowed to stand in this scenario, it
would provide for the impoundment and destruction of this
offending advertisement. Ms. Magazine would be forced to
reprint its issue solely for Indiana's consumption in order not
to run afoul of the statute. In a national market, such state line
scare tactics are egregious. The chilling effect such a statute
could have on future shipments of magazines is also daunting.
Publications would be forced to either comply with the
requirements of the most expansive right of publicity statutes
or risk destruction of product. A rational magazine publisher
would probably decide simply not to publish "borderline"
advertisements." 7 The confusion and high costs inherent in
tracking down estate representatives would preclude the
research, and likely a simple policy of advertisement rejection
would supplant the editorial process.
The Indiana statute is, of course, not limited to
advertisements. Tee shirts, posters, postcards, ashtrays,
pencils, shot glasses-any product that depicts an aspect of
persona is covered under the statute's "commercial purpose"
definition."' This provision, combined with the one hundred
year term of protection means that any product bearing the
image of a personality such as Mark Twain, Queen Victoria,
Grover Cleveland, or even Leo Tolstoy 5 9 could fall under
Indiana's protection. A distant relative, unable to assert a
cause of action in almost any other forum, could travel from the
Steppes of Russia to Indiana and assert a right of publicity
claim against dreaded unlicensed Tolstoy tee shirts.
that the premier licensor of descendible rights of publicity is headquartered in
Indianapolis. See supra note 76. Certainly, chapter thirteen of Indiana's property law
is a tremendous legal windfall for CMG and its clients. The local interest of protecting
the rights of publicity of those clients-the foremost personalities of the twentieth
century according to CMG, is significant. But significant enough to require the
adherence to Indiana's expansive law by every publisher or other producer of material
that may constitute a "commercial purpose" under the broad statute?
117 See J. THOMAS McCARTHY, THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY
§ 11.4
(1999) ("[Mlost businesses will not carve up their territorial market on the basis of a
lawyer's advice as to the law in some states. They must do business nationwide or not
at all.").
.8 In today's market, the types of products licensed depicting images of
recognizable personalities is virtually limitless. Some of the more absurd examples
include stopwatches licensed by supermodel Kathy Ireland and Malcolm X
"fisherman's hats."
"o Edward H. Rosenthal, Selling Princess Diana: Legal Limits on Celebrity
Memorabilia,4 INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY STRATEGIST 2, 3 (1977).
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Unlicensed Tolstoy tee shirts or posters could be impounded
and destroyed at Indiana's borders.16 Considering the vast
protection afforded by the statute to personalities who may not
assert a right of publicity anywhere else, and the expansive
product range covered in the "commercial purpose" definition,
the burden on interstate commerce is significant.
Also, as many commentators have indicated, such a
burden forces producers-who must "compete nationally or not
at all"--to comply with the regulation of the most restrictive
state. In other words, Indiana is essentially imposing
nationwide restrictions on production because the rational
manufacturer is unlikely to alter distribution based on
individual differences in state law. ' The simpler answer is to
comply with the most expansive statute-in this case, Indiana.
Therefore, Indiana's legislature is not only legislating rights
into existence in contradiction with other states' legislaturesit has also preempted Congress in this regard by setting the
nationwide standard for persona-depicting products.
The most troubling constitutional concern with
expansive statutes like Indiana's is the conflict with the
publisher's or producer's First Amendment protection.'62 The
chilling effect likely to occur after the first action is brought
under Indiana's statute will affect all future invocations of
celebrity. Take the example of a greeting card company in
Seattle, Washington whose designer creates a humorous card
a whip. 163
depicting Susan B. Anthony in a leather corset with
While such a card would be fair game in most of the fifty
states, because Ms. Anthony died domiciled in New York, a
state that does not recognize the descendible right of publicity,
it would be banned in Indiana. Would the publisher think twice
before permitting such a card to hit the stands? Possibly. While
10 The grand-niece of Tolstoy would be wise to seek the assistance of CMG in

Indianapolis. CMG represents the interests of other writers, entertainers, musicians
and historical figures including Malcom X, Amelia Earheart, Jack Kerouac, Babe Ruth,
Frank Lloyd Wright, and Oscar Wilde. See http://www.cmgww.com.
'" MCCARTHY, supra note 2, at § 6:58.
scholarly commentary on the impact of the First
102 The considerable
Amendment on the right of publicity is beyond the scope of this note. See supra note
27.
'0 Thanks to Brooklyn Law School Professor Michael Madow for the
subversive greeting card example. Not, of course, specifically involving Ms. Anthony.
I'm afraid that image is all mine.
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the artistic merit and social value of the greeting card are
debatable, such factors are not normally considered when
determining whether a speaker has a First Amendment right
to speak. Here, what could be construed by some as a
subversive statement about gender roles has been silenced."6
In short, Indiana's statute is constitutionally
problematic for three reasons. First, it violates legislative due
process by overriding the policy of the state controlling the
succession of intestate property. Second, it imposes heavy
burdens on interstate commerce and copyright regulations
with its expansiveness. Third, the First Amendment concerns
surrounding the right of publicity are magnified by Indiana's
expansive statute. However, an amendment allowing domicile
to control the statute's application may save it from inevitable
judicial correction.'65
If Indiana required an element of domicile to control
choice of law application, many of the constitutional concerns
would be ameliorated. The Susan B. Anthony hypothetical
above would not implicate Indiana's statute. Traditional choice
of law principles would allow the beleaguered general counsel
of Her Voice, Inc. some sort of predictability in terms of
determining whether Anthony's right of publicity survived her.
The greater predictability created by adding a domicile element
would also provide protection against the interstate commerce
burden. Publishers would have right and wrong answers about
the right of publicity, at least in terms of whether or not it
exists. This could also aid in thawing the chilling effect on
those same publisher's and printer's First Amendment rights.
IV.

EXTENDING THE DOMICILE RULE

Thus far, this Note has demonstrated that domicile
controls the rule regarding the descendibility of the right of
publicity. 166 Also, Part III demonstrated the problems inherent
in a statute that ignores domicile as a controlling factor. These
same problems exist for living plaintiffs, though to a lesser
'" While Ms. Anthony may object to her costume in the depiction, surely she
would not object to subversive gender modeling.
...Indiana should take note-California's § 990 also provided protection
regardless of domicile only to be judicially corrected. See discussion in supra Part II.A.
"G See supra Part II.A and II.B.
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degree, when domicile does not figure into the analysis of what
law applies. Examining the garden-variety right of publicity
action shows that there is no viable reason why the domicile
rule should not control the threshold questions in right of
publicity choice of law analysis for living plaintiffs.
Arguments against employing domicile controls to
govern the threshold question of whether the right of publicity
exists include the idea that as an intangible property right, the
right of publicity has no particular "situs.""' In response to the
suggestion that New York has implemented the bifurcated
approach of domicile to control the right's existence, J. Thomas
McCarthy urges that such a choice of law analysis should be
limited to only descendibility questions."' Further, some
commentators urge that domicile is no longer a valid
consideration in light of the mobility in today's modern society
and the rise of intangible property."9 In fact, none of these
arguments are sustainable in light of the need for
predictability in determining right of publicity cases.170
True, the right of publicity, if a property right at all, is
definitely intangible. Nonetheless, this does not necessarily
render it without a situs for choice of law purposes. When there
is some document that expresses aspects of an intangible
property right, like a stock certificate, the situs of that
document is generally the situs of the right. " The former rule
167 Cray, supra note 1, at 654.

1G8MCCARTHY, supra note 2, at § 11:17.
1G Cray, supra note 1, at 654.
[T]he doctrine of domicile has adequately served as a practical
working rule in the simpler societies out of which it arose. More
particularly, its difficulties of application were circumscribed when
wealth predominantly consisted of realty and tangibles, and when
restricted modes of transportation and communication conditioned
fixity of residence. In view of the enormous extent to which intangibles
now constitute wealth, and the increasing mobility of men, . . . the
necessity of a single headquarters for all legal purposes ... tends to be
a less and less useful fiction. In the setting of modern circumstances,
the inflexible doctrine of domicile-one man, one home-is in danger of
becoming a social anachronism.
Texas v. Florida, 306 U.S. 398, 429 (1939) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
170 Though some states still regard the right as sounding in
tort, its
proponents urge that it is in fact a property right. As such, stability and predictability
are essential. See discussion of property choice of law rules in Part I.B, supra.
17 The problems in determining the "situs" of intangible property have
specifically been addressed primarily in issues of in rem or quasi in rem jurisdiction. In
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of the situs of a debt for jurisdictional purposes was that the
debt followed the debtor. However, later case law determined
that jurisdiction over the debt, without more, did not constitute
jurisdiction over the debtor. This has caused the old common
law idea of intangible property following its owner to fall into
some disrepute.
In the case of a right of publicity, the right is more like
a stock certificate than a debt or other chose in action without
a situs. The piece of paper in the example of the stock
certificate serves as evidence of the intangible's existence. In
much the same way, the personality herself is adequate
evidence of the right's existence. The right of publicity is
evidenced by the aspects of the personality's demeanor,
likeness, and voice that have been deemed to be commercially
valuable. These aspects literally travel with the personality.
She herself is living proof, so to speak, that she is in possession
of these qualities. The commercial use to which her likeness
has been put is presumptive evidence of its value. In this way,
the human being asserting the right is herself the situs-much
like the stock certificate or other document establishes the
existence of an intangible interest in a corporation. The
individual herself is her own best evidence.
This is decidedly unlike a chose in action or a debt, the
situs of which is no longer considered to follow the debtor or
the assertor of the action for jurisdictional questions.'7 2
Limiting the question to choice of law, rendering the person
and her right of publicity inseparable,173 is an utterly
such questions, where the document in question is the embodiment of such intangible
rights, such as a negotiable instrument or a stock certificate, the court has been held to
have jurisdiction over the intangible and thus the situs is inseparable from the
document. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAWS § 363 (1988); Cities Serv. Co. v.
McGrath, 342 U.S. 330 (1905). Whereas the principle of the document's location
determining situs has eroded in jurisdictional questions, Shaffer v. Heitner, 443 U.S.
186 (1977), there is no reason to suspect it is not a viable situs determination for choice
of law purposes.
172 In fact, the circumstances under which that principle has eroded are
jurisdictional questions. See supra, note 104. In Harris v. Balk, 198 U.S. 215 (1905) it
was deemed that jurisdiction of a debt no longer was sufficient to give the court
personal jurisdiction over the debtor. This is the origination of the idea that the debt
and the debtor are no longer inseparable. Here, no one would seriously assert that, as
in Harris v. Balk, jurisdiction over the right of publicity necessarily gives personal
jurisdiction over the personality herself.
173 Presuming the right is not assigned, of course. In the case of an
assignment, the choice of law principals can be carefully set out in the assignment
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reasonable touchstone. If domicile is sufficient for the larger
and more complicated question of jurisdiction, as it always is,'74
it should similarly be sufficient as a defining factor as to the
existence of a right of publicity.
The Cairns I court easily dispensed with the Estate's
allegations that California was the situs of Diana's right of
publicity. First, the Estate sought to bring the intangible
property within California cases dealing only with
jurisdictional questions.17 5 The Cairns I court wisely
distinguished these cases, concerning jurisdiction over
intangible property, from those pertaining to whether the
intangible property even existed in the first place.1 76 Second,
the Estate attempted to establish California as the situs on the
grounds that the registration of the claim to assert the right
was filed there.7 7 The Cairns I court countered that the
registration was not a manifestation of the right; it was,
instead, a notice of the estate's intention to prosecute others
wishing to exploit Diana's right of publicity.'78 Finally, in a bit
of circular reasoning, the Estate alleged that Diana's right of
publicity had risen to a "chose in action," located in California
because the offending products had been distributed there.'79
There can be no chose in action if the right itself never came
into existence,18 ° it is necessary to answer that threshold
question before a chose in action can be deemed to exist.'8'
Therefore, in line with the principles of § 946, domicile 82was
looked to as the most rational law governing the property.

itself. Then, questions of choice of law would be determined by contracts principles.
Most often, courts will defer to the expectations of the parties and the choice of law
expressed in the contract, if there is one. Courts would likely deem parties in such a
case to have expected that their assignment was valid, and would likely find that the
right of publicity existed.
174 Personal jurisdiction is always assertable over a person domiciled in the
forum seeking to assert jurisdiction. Domicile is prima facie sufficient minimum
contacts. Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457 (1940).
175 CairnsI, 24 F. Supp. 2d at 1026-27.
...Id. at 1026-27.
" Id. at 1027.
178

Id. at 1027-28.

171

CairnsI, 24 F. Supp. 2d at 1028.

18OId.
181Id.
182 Id.
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In a parenthetical footnote, McCarthy urges that the
New York extension of the domicile control to living plaintiffs
is an "overgeneralization of a narrow rule."83 At the same time,
McCarthy concedes that a domicile controlling rule would lead
to a high degree of predictability." Further, he urges that
domicile shopping is not a legitimate concern.185 McCarthy
argues, however, that a "fairer" rule is the "most significant
relationship" test advanced by the Restatement Second of
Conflict of Laws. 88 The "narrow" rule of domicile controlling
descendibility is, in fact, easily applied to living plaintiffs
without necessarily "overgeneralizing" or leading to unfair
results. A person's domicile is a substantial factor in any choice
of law analysis."7 The initial question of whether the right of
publicity ever came into existence is the most essential element
where predictability is concerned. 8 The scope of the right, once
it is determined to exist, can easily be determined by an
interest analysis, as McCarthy proposes.
For example, say that a plaintiff domiciled in New
York brings an action in another state which does not recognize
the right of publicity but which follows a Currie-type
governmental interest analysis. Under a domicile control rule,
the forum state would first look to the law of plaintiffs
domicile, New York, to determine whether that right exists.
Finding that the New York statute does grant the right of
protection to its domiciliaries who are still alive,'8 9 that forum
state could then engage in the more thorough choice of law
analysis to determine the scope of that right. Likely, the New
York statute would control since New York has an interest in
protecting the rights of its domiciliaries. The forum in question
MCCARTHY, supra note 2, at § 11.15 n.11.

14 Id. at § 11:18.
IS Id.

"8 The multifaceted functional test of the Second
Restatement of
Conflict of Law [sic] offers an unpredictable approach, but one that is
fairer than a rigid rule resting solely upon domicile ....
If the state of
a plaintiffs domicile does not recognize the rights of publicity or
privacy and the state (or states) of infringement does, the court can
look to the policy behind the one state's recognition and the other's
rejection. If the policy of the rejecting state will not be offended by
applying the law of the recognition state, then that seems a fair result.

Id.

See discussion of choice of law theories, supra Part I.B.
188Id.
usKSee discussion of New York right of publicity, supraPart II.B.
18
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likely does not have an interest in denying plaintiff her right of
publicity. Therefore, the action is an example of Currie's "false
conflict" situation, where generally the law of the state with an
interest is applied.19
At the same time, if a plaintiff whose domicile does not
recognize the right of publicity attempted to "shop" for a forum
that did, the domicile rule would preclude this action. As a
preliminary matter, the forum would determine that plaintiff
had no such right, nor any expectation of any such right as
determined by her domicile and therefore could not seek to
take advantage of a forum that did. In this manner, the
domicile rule addresses the troubling question of forum
shopping that many conflict rules are in place to discourage.'91
The interest analysis is precluded, but wisely. An interest
analysis that gave rise to a right that plaintiff had no grounds
to expect is a kind of result-oriented judicial activism, not the
"fairer" result McCarthy suggests.
Another argument against the domicile control rule is
that the concept of domicile has lost its power in modern
society. True, it is possible in the twentieth century to be so
mobile that one is, for practical purposes, stateless. 92 However,
there is generally one place that is the center of at least one's
business activities. Over the past twenty years, it has become
more and more fashionable for celebrities to incorporate
companies to which they assign their rights of publicity. While
incorporation does afford them the opportunity to choose a
190 Similarly, if the same state used a "most significant relationship" analysis,

New York law would also control the first question of whether the right exists. That
being determined, the various factors articulated in Section 6 of the Restatement could
be addressed to determine what law applies to the right. See discussion of choice of law
theories, supra Part I.B.
'9'Some would argue that forum shopping is encouraged by the
implementation of a domicile rule. Potential plaintiffs could seek to domicile
themselves in a forum receptive to the right of publicity. However, as McCarthy points
out, people rarely determine questions of domicile based on what law applies there.
While it is a sort of "chicken or egg" question, it is, however, likely that the law of one's
domicile is the law one expects to be applied in an action. If people chose where to live
based on the expansiveness of right of publicity statutes, one can expect that the
streets of French Lick, Indiana will soon resemble the red carpet in front of the
Dorothy Chandler Pavilion on Oscar night.
12 Rostropovich v. Koch Int'l Corp. 94 Civ. 2674, 1995
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2785
(S.D.N.Y 1995); see also Matthews v. ABC Television, Inc., No. 88 Civ. 6031, 1989 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 10694, *9 (Sept. 11, 1989) (lamenting the chore of divining the right of
publicity law of Kenya.).
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forum for their rights to be developed within, celebrities who
have taken steps to protect their rights should be afforded that
extra protection. For the purposes of determining domicile in
terms of right of publicity questions, the company's seat of
incorporation would control. 193 While some would argue that
this practice leads to exactly the kind of forum shopping that
the domicile rule is in place to control, in fact this is not the
case. When a personality has reached the kind of prominence
where an assignment of rights to a corporation is economically
sound, such an assignment serves as adequate notice that the
personality seeks to exploit those rights. Rarely does someone
who does not intend to exploit those rights, assign them.
The domicile rule is concerned more with plaintiffs
asserting rights "after the fact." Simply, it does not make sense
to permit forum shopping to protect rights the plaintiff did not
expect to have. Forum shopping aside, it has always been the
case that economic decisions are based on factors such as
simplicity and ease of doing business. People intending to
actively exploit their rights of publicity have always sought
amenable for a, domicile rule or no domicile rule.
Instead of a domicile control, commentators have
argued that another factor more closely related to the
infringement should control. For example, some commentators
have urged that "the place of greatest infringement" is the
deciding factor.19 4 Still others have argued that "the place of
greatest exploitation" is the most logical rule to follow.'9 5 In
fact, neither of these schemes is effective in a national market
to address the most critical issue in right of publicity actions:
predictability. First of all, in a national distribution market it
is basically impossible to determine where the "place of
greatest infringement" is located. It is equally impossible to
determine where the personality has focused the exploitation of
those rights.

i

The domicile of a corporation is generally the place of incorporation and the
location of the business headquarters.
194 Cray, supra note 1, at 641; see also MCCARTHY, supra note 2, at §
11.31D][2].
195Bi-Rite Enter. Inc. v. Bruce Miner Poster Co., 616 F. Supp. 71, 74 (D. Mass.
1984).
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CONCLUSION

The domicile control rule provides an essential, easily
definable touchstone for deciding initial questions of whether
the right of publicity has come into existence. As a stop-gap
measure, it is necessary to establish a uniform means of
determining such questions for the sake of predictability. Until
more states have defined the right, or, alternatively, Congress
has set forth a unifying statute, the New York courts have
implemented the wisest analytical structure. In addition, the
domicile control should be included in any right of publicity
legislation to avoid the constitutional pitfalls of overbroad
statutes. The bifurcated analysis of domicile first, interests
second, leads to smooth, predictable initial answers and should
be implemented by more courts in deciding choice of law
problems as to right of publicity questions.
Melinda R. Eades'
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